Biography in English

Chang Tso-lin 張作霖 T. Yü-t'ing 雨亭 Chang Tso-lin (1873-June 1928), known as the Old Marshal, military leader who consolidated control of the Northeast. He began as the leader of a local army in Fengtien and rose to rule Manchuria as a virtually autonomous state from 1919 to his death. After 1924, Chang extended his control to Peking and he served as a barrier to the unification of China by the revolutionary forces. He was succeeded as ruler of Manchuria by his son Chang Hsueh-liang 張學良 (q.v.). A family biography prepared shortly after Chang Tso-lin's death in 1928 provides some information about his early years. According to that source, he was born in Haich'eng, Fengtien. He was the fourth child in the family. The oldest son died in infancy, the second son was executed as a bandit, and the third child was a girl. His father, Chang Yu-ts'ai, died about 1882, and his mother later married the village veterinarian. Of peasant origin and without education, the young Chang Tso-lin appeared to have limited prospects.

He began his military career before he was 20. He enlisted in the unit known as the I-chun, commanded by Sung Ch'ing (ECCP, II, 68688) and fought in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95. After the war he returned to Fengtien province to organize an armed group to protect his native district. Through his capacities for leadership, Chang built a substantial and well-organized military force of his own. In training local militia in Fengtien, he was closely associate with Chang Ching-hui, who later became premier of the Japanese-sponsored government of Manchoukuo, and with Chang Tso-hsiang, who later became governor of Kirin province. Because Chang Tso-lin was not in the official military system of imperial China, he is often referred to as having been a bandit. During the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5, Chang Tso-lin and his troops became irregular allies of the Japanese and engaged in harassing attacks against the Russians. Chang emerged from that conflict with substantial military power and with increased prestige in southern Manchuria. After the war he came to an agreement with Chao Erh-sun (q.v.), who was then military governor of Fengtien, and his unit was organized into a regiment. Although his fortunes were not immediately advanced, Chang had found a useful political patron. Chao Erh-sun soon afterwards went to Peking to take up a metropolitan post, but he returned to Mukden as governor general of all Manchuria in April 1911. On the eve of the 1911 revolution, the territorial guard forces comprised a total of 40 battalions, divided into five routes, and Chang Tso-lin commanded the Forward Route, with garrison station at Taonanfu. When the Wuchang revolt broke out, Chao Erh-sun transferred the Rear Route guard force from the Liaoyuan-Tungliao sector to Mukden. Chang Tso-lin, sensing a political opportunity, on his own initiative moved his guard troops to the Mukden sector. Chao Erh-sun accepted this action, and soon afterwards he gave Chang concurrent command of the Central Route guard force stationed in the Mukden-Tiehling sector. When Lan T'ien-yü and his 2nd Mixed Brigade threatened revolt, Chang put down the incipient rebellion, and thus made a major contribution to the maintenance of order in the Northeast.

After the establishment of the new republican government and the accession to power of Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1912, the Manchurian provinces came under the nominal control of Peking. The Mukden garrison forces were reorganized into two divisions, the 27th and the 28th. In September 1912 Chang Tso-lin, now a lieutenant general, took command of the 27th Division; Feng Te-lin, who had commanded the Left Route garrison force, received command of the 28th Division.

In November 1912 Chao Erh-sun was succeeded in Fengtien by Chang Hsi-luan, who had known both Chang Tso-lin and Feng Te-lin for years. Chang Hsi-luan effectively commanded their respect and obedience. When Yuan Shih-k'ai launched his scheme to become emperor at Peking in 1915, Chang Tso-lin and Feng Te-lin initially supported that move. Yuan, however, appointed his trusted lieutenant Tuan Chih-kuei to be military commander of the Northeast and civil governor of Fengtien. Tuan's father, Tuan Yu-heng, had acted as guarantor for Chang Tso-lin when Chang had made his arrangements with the Ch'ing authorities several years earlier. The new appointment of Tuan Chih-kuei, however, was a clear challenge to Chang Tso-lin's political ambitions in Manchuria; on Tuan's recommendation, Yuan Shih-k'ai ordered Chang and his 27th Division to Hunan.

Chang was saved from transfer by "popular protest," doubtless organized by Chang himself. When opposition to Yuan's monarchical scheme developed in Yunnan in December 1916, Chang let it be rumored that Manchuria was going to declare its independence and issued plans for the establishment of a so-called people's peace preservation society. Chang was challenging the authority of Tuan Chih-kuei, and Yuan Shih-k'ai, if he desired to keep Fengtien from rebelling, would have to give Chang Tso-lin a responsible post. Tuan Chih-kuei resigned and left Mukden. Chang was made tutuh [military governor] of Fengtien.

After the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai, Chang Tso-lin moved to consolidate his personal control of southern Manchuria. He became tuchün (the new title for military governor) and civil governor of Fengtien, retaining control of the 27th Division. Trouble arose when T'ang Yu-lin, commanding the 53rd Brigade of the 27th Division, endeavored to organize a movement against Chang's authority. Chang Tso-lin heard of T'ang's scheme, and T'ang fled with a small force to Hsinmin. Chang sent Chang Tso-hsiang after him with a cavalry force, but T'ang was saved from immediate retribution by the intervention of Chang Hai-p'eng, the commander of the 55th Brigade of Feng Te-lin's 28th Division.

Chang Tso-lin chose not to pursue the affair. Feng Te-lin, however, tried to exploit the situation. He made contact with Wu Chün-sheng, the commander of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, with the aim of overthrowing Chang Tso-lin. When he heard of this plot, Chang Tso-lin made a number of command shifts and dispatched the 56th Brigade of the 28th Division on a bandit-suppression mission in Liaosi. At the end of May 1917 Chang deployed the 27th and 29th divisions against Feng Te-lin and announced that he was changing the commands. Feng, seeking a way out of his predicament, reached an agreement with Chang Hsün (q.v.) and left the area in haste to participate in Chang Hsin's restoration attempt of July. Thus, Chang Tsolin came to control the 28th Division.

In 1917 Chang succeeded in having one of his own supporters named military governor of Heilungkiang province by Tuan Ch'i-jui (q.v.) who then was premier at Peking. Early in 1918 Chang lent Fengtien military support to Tuan Ch'i-jui and his lieutenant Hsu Shu-cheng (q.v.) to exert pressure on Feng Kuo-chang (q.v.) in north China. When Tuan Ch'i-jui again became premier at Peking, he repaid Chang Tso-lin by naming him in September 1918 to the post of inspector general of the Three Eastern Provinces. In that year Chang added seven mixed brigades to his domain's military forces. When Meng En-yuan, the Kirin military governor, resisted his authority, Chang forced him out of office in mid-1919 and had one of his supporters, Pao Kuei-ch'ing, appointed to the Kirin post. Chang's personal control of the Northeast was complete. During the final decade of Chang Tso-lin's life, his domain in Manchuria was, for all practical purposes, an autonomous state. Although his political and military ventures in north China during those years were inconclusive, nevertheless, with the support of Japan, he was at all times in control of the provinces lying to the northeast of the Great Wall.

From 1917 until 1920 Chang Tso-lin had cooperated closely with Tuan Ch'i-jui, to their mutual benefit. Late in 1919, however, Hsu Shu-cheng began to build up a personal empire in the Mongolian borderlands, disregarding Chang Tso-lin's view that the area fell within the Northeastern sphere of influence. The alliance with Chang was broken as a result of these actions. Tuan Ch'i-jui, however, continued to support Hsu Shu-cheng. Chang Tso-lin joined forces with the Chihli generals led by Ts'ao K'un (q.v.), and the combined Chihli and Fengtien forces administered a swift series of defeats to Tuan Ch'i-jui's forces. On 13 July Chang announced that he was sending forces inside the Great Wall. The Chihli forces defeated Tuan and his Anfu forces in a battle near Paoting on 18 July, and Tuan resigned his post the following day. The victors, however, were unable to agree on the composition of a new government, and in mid-August of 1920 the Fengtien forces withdrew to Manchuria. They took with them the heavy equipment captured from Tuan Ch'i-jui's armies, an action that sowed additional seeds of dissension between the Chihli generals and Chang Tso-lin.

Developments in Outer Mongolia occupied the attention of both Chang Tso-lin and the Japanese. In the spring of 1921, after the abortive intervention of Baron von Ungern-Sternberg and his White Russian forces, a provisional people's government of Mongolia was established at Urga (Ulan Bator) in March. In May, units of the Russian Red Army also entered Outer Mongolia. Although the new authorities in Outer Mongolia had declared their independence of the republican government of China, Chang Tso-lin was appointed high commissioner for the Mongolian borderlands and was charged with the task of maintaining Chinese influence there. As a result of that appointment, his authority was extended into Inner Mongolia, to the south of the Gobi. Chang's men were appointed to high positions in the three special districts of Jehol, Chahar, and Suiyuan. But the combined Russian Red Army and Mongol forces on 6 June 1921 occupied Urga (Ulan Bator), and on 10 July the provisional people's government became the people's revolutionary government of Mongolia. The Soviet Union supported the new regime and signed a treaty of friendship with it on 5 November. Chang, who had received a large sum of money to finance his military expedition against Outer Mongolia, reputedly pocketed the money. He turned again to north China politics.

In December 1921, Chang Tso-lin succeeded in installing his chosen instrument, Liang Shih-i (q.v.), as premier at Peking. Chang's challenging position in north China, where he was again aligned with Tuan Ch'i-jui, alarmed his nominal allies, especially the Chihli faction. Ts'ao K'un and Wu P'ei-fu were not prepared to cede north China to Fengtien control, and Wu P'ei-fu was able to force Liang Shih-i to abandon his post in January 1922. Chang Tso-lin's attempts to buttress Liang's position proved futile. The first Chihli-Fengtien war began in April 1922, when Chang Tso-lin started to move his troops inside the Great Wall. In a public telegram of 19 April he announced that his move was designed to unify his "rear shield." Ts'ao K'un, in a telegram of 22 April, opposed the proposition that unity should be achieved through military force. Other north China militarists, including Feng Yü-hsiang (q.v.), supported Ts'ao's position. Chang announced on 1 May 1922 that henceforth all Manchurian affairs would be handled independently by the Northeastern authorities at Mukden and that Manchuria was aligning itselfwith the "Southwestern authorities," that is, Kwangsi and Kwangtung. Thus, he temporarily allied himself with the loose grouping that included Sun Yat-sen.

In the battle that was joined on 3 May at Ch'anghsintien, near Peking, the Fengtien forces were defeated. Chang Tso-lin then pulled his troops back into Manchuria, leaving Wu P'ei-fu dominant in north China. Hsu Shihch'ang, who then held the presidency at Peking, had stripped Chang Tso-lin of his posts on 1 May. But the conflict was inconclusive in view of Chang's remaining military strength, some 100,000 troops, and his special position with respect to the Japanese in Manchuria. He then proclaimed himself commander in chief for peace preservation in the Three Eastern Provinces and began to ready his forces for another bid for power in north China.

Early in 1923 Sun Yat-sen sent Wang Ching-wei to talk with Chang Tso-lin and with Lu Yung-hsiang, the military governor of Chekiang and a supporter of Tuan Ch'i-jui, about a so-called triple alliance, based on the political program of the Kuomintang. Chang and Lu, however, qualified their acceptance by insisting that Wu P'ei-fu be overthrown and that China be unified before they would enter into such an alliance. The position of Chang Tso-lin's regime at Mukden complicated the foreign relations of the Peking government during this period. Chang's government performed all the functions of a sovereign state, including the making of treaties with foreign governments. This ambiguous situation was evident in connection with the problem of the Chinese Eastern Railway. On 31 May 1924 the Peking government signed an agreement with the Soviet Union defining the Status of that railroad and the rights of the two parties in its operation. To make the agreement effective, it was necessary to obtain Chang Tsolin's acceptance of its terms, since the rail line ran through his Manchurian territory. The Peking government sent an emissary to Mukden to attempt to obtain his acquiescence, but that mission failed. However, Chang's position on the Chinese Eastern Railway issue was awkward, since he could not count on Japanese support in the contravention of a treaty properly concluded by the Chinese government at Peking. At the same time, since he was preparing for a new war against Wu P'ei-fu, he could not afford to aggravate relations with Moscow.

The Soviet government therefore was able to take advantage of the situation, and a separate Mukden-Soviet treaty was concluded on 20 September 1924. By this agreement, which was signed by Chang and Nikolai Kuznetsov as the Soviet representative, the Russians were granted rights with regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway similar to those covered in the May 1924 treaty that Chang Tso-lin had refused to recognize. This action temporarily restored the special Russian position in northern Manchuria. Another salient aspect of the September 1924 treaty, however, was that in permitting Chang Tso-lin to save face by repudiating the right of the Peking government to conclude an international agreement on a specifically Manchurian question without his consent a dangerous precedent was created. The Mukden agreement recognized Chang Tso-lin's government of the Three Eastern Provinces as a separate and autonomous regime at a time when he was in open rebellion against the central government of China, thus laying the foundations for the proclamation of independence of Manchuokuo in 1932.

War had begun on 1 September 1924 between Chekiang and Kiangsu. Chang promptly announced his support of his Chekiang ally Lu Yung-hsiang and moved forces against Jehol. As he advanced, Wu P'ei-fu moved to reinforce Chengteh, the provincial capital. On 5 September Sun Yat-sen issued a manifesto opposing Ts'ao K'un and Wu P'ei-fu and on 1 8 September announced that his proposed northern expedition aimed to overthrow the warlords and the imperialism on which they relied.

By the beginning of October, Chang Tso-lin was attacking at Shanhaikuan. As Wu P'ei-fu advanced northward with his army to meet the invasion at Shanhaikuan, the situation was disrupted by the defection of Feng Yü-hsiang (q.v.), who was a subordinate of Wu. Feng abandoned his sector of the front at Kupeikow, proceeded rapidly to Peking, staged a coup d'etat, and issued a public call for peace in October. The coup had been worked out in advance with Chang Tso-lin. The forces of Feng Yü-hsiang and those of Fengtien commander Chang Tsung-ch'ang (q.v.), cut off the line of retreat of Wu P'ei-fu's forces deployed along the eastern end of the Great Wall. The war ended in disastrous defeat for the Chihli faction and left the Fengtien group in a stronger position than ever in north China.

The new regime at Peking centered on a coalition of Chang Tso-lin, Feng Yü-hsiang, and Tuan Ch'i-jui. However, the alliance began to disintegrate even as victory was being consolidated. One paramount problem was that of relations with the forces of revolutionary nationalism in south China, where Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang were consolidating their position in alliance with the Communists. Chang Tso-lin, who was opposed to the concept of revolutionary change, met with Sun Yat-sen in December 1924, when Sun arrived in north China to confer with the generals holding power there. He discovered that Sun Yat-sen's plans were considerably at variance with those which he and Tuan Ch'i-jui had made. When Sun, by then seriously ill, finally arrived at Peking at the end of December, Feng Yü-hsiang had already retired in disagreement with his former allies, and Chang Tso-lin and Tuan Ch'i-jui were patently opposed to the establishment of a new government in which, as Sun Yat-sen hoped, the Kuomintang would exercise dominant authority. The death of Sun Yat-sen in March 1925 only confused the situation further.

Chang Tso-lin and the Fengtien generals succeeded in pushing southward to the Shanghai area at the beginning of 1925 and also attempted to drive westward along the Lunghai rail line to penetrate Honan province. But Chang had to face continuing opposition during the year from competing leaders with autonomous military forces. Sun Ch'uan-fang (q.v.) in the lower Yangtze provinces defeated the Fengtien forces in October 1925, while Feng Yü-hsiang, Chang Tso-lin's erstwhile ally, posed a threat from Honan. Faced with an unpromising military situation and with a deteriorated position at Peking brought about by the political pressures that he had exerted on Tuan Ch'i-jui, Chang Tso-lin withdrew important elements of his army to the Great Wall and into Manchuria.

Feng Yü-hsiang then joined with Sun Ch'uan-fang and Wu P'ei-fu ; and they formed an army to drive the Fengtien forces from north China. In a move to break up that combination, Chang Tso-lin sent an envoy to Feng Yü-hsiang to review the situation. Feng went through the motions of forsaking his new alliance in favor of a reconciliation with Chang Tso-lin, but Feng had actually won over a Fengtien general, Kuo Sung-ling (q.v.), to betray his chief. In November 1925 Kuo Sung-ling issued a telegram demanding the retirement of Chang Tso-lin in favor of his son, Chang Hsueh-liang (q.v.). Kuo's move, designed to divert attention to Manchuria while Feng Yü-hsiang's Kuominchün attacked in north China, apparently had Soviet sympathy, if not actual support. But it failed because the Japanese at once intervened in the Mukden area. Kuo Sung-ling soon was captured and was executed in December 1925.

The Soviet Union and Japan were concerned with developments in Manchuria because of their competition for influence in that critical area. The fact that Chang Tso-lin, with indirect assistance from Japanese officials, emerged victorious from the Kuo Sung-ling incident did little to stabilize the situation. In January 1926 Chang Tso-lin gave vent to his anti-Russian feelings again. In a blunt effort to demolish Soviet railroad interests in Manchuria, the Northeast authorities on 21 January 1926 arbitrarily arrested A. N. Ivanov, the general manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway, three Soviet directors of the railroad, and other Soviet citizens. On the following day Moscow replied with an equally blunt ultimatum fixing a three-day time limit for the release of the Russian prisoners and for the restoration of normal traffic on the line. The threat of Soviet military action forced Chang Tso-lin to back down, and on 24 January an agreement was signed at Mukden calling for the restoration of the status quo ante on the railroad.

In the sphere of domestic politics, Chang Tso-lin had joined forces in January 1926 with Wu P'ei-fu, a natural alliance since both men were anxious for revenge against Feng Yü-hsiang. Feng himself, judiciously estimating the potential military strength that could be marshaled against him, resigned his posts and departed on a visit to Moscow. His Kuominchün forces were defeated in north China and driven back into Inner Mongolia. Later in the year, the Nationalists, based at Canton, had launched their Northern Expedition in July 1926 and then drove rapidly through Hunan toward the Yangtze. The Fengtien forces had reached an agreement with Sun Ch'uan-fang in the lower Yangtze region, and in December 1 926 the northern generals formally united for joint defense against the revolutionary armies surging up from the south. After a meeting at Tientsin, the northern generals on 1 December 1926 announced the formation of the Ankuochün [national pacification army]. Chang Tso-lin was its commander in chief, with Sun Ch'uan-fang, Chang Tsung-ch'ang, and Yen Hsi-shan as deputy commanders. Wu P'ei-fu, who had remained distrustful of Chang Tso-lin, was associated with the coalition, but was not part of its command.

By the spring of 1927, the position of Chang Tso-lin in north China was under heavy attack. The revolutionary armies commanded by T'ang Sheng-chih and Chang Fa-k'uei (qq.v.) were pressing hard on the Fengtien positions in Honan; while Feng Yü-hsiang, now professing Nationalist sympathies, threatened the flank of Chang's forces. On 28 May, Chang Tso-lin ordered all Fengtien forces committed on the southern front to withdraw to Chihli (Hopei) and Shantung. On 5 June, Yen Hsi-shan declared himself on the side of the Nationalists and advised Chang Tso-lin to do the same. Chang replied on 18 June 1927 by publicly assuming the title of Ta-yuan-shuai, a rank that had previously been held by Yuan Shih-k'ai and Sun Yat-sen. Chang indicated that he intended to remain in the northern capital. Actually, Chang Tso-lin's hold on Peking during his last, short-lived period of supremacy there meant the virtual end of the already shadowy authority of the central government of China represented by Peking.

Chang Tso-lin's final period of ascendancy at Peking also had an aggravating effect on Sino- Soviet relations, which were considerably strained by Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist coup in the spring of 1927. Chang Tso-lin had nurtured a consistent distrust of the Russians, both White and Red, since the time of the Russo-Japanese war. In no way chastened by the results of the abortive 1926 move against the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, he began a series of resolute blows against Soviet interests and representatives in north China. On 28 February Chang Tsung-ch'ang (q.v.) detained the Russian vessel Pamyat Lenina, which was on its way to Hankow. It is probable that the intelligence documents he obtained led to Chang Tso-lin's raid on the Soviet embassy at Peking. On 6 April, Chang Tso-lin ordered a force of the Peking municipal police and his own men to raid the premises of the Soviet embassy inside the Legation Quarter. The raiding party seized truckloads of documents, in both Russian and Chinese, relating to Soviet espionage and the Communist effort in China. It also seized Li Ta-chao (q.v.) and other Chinese Communists who had taken refuge in the compound three months earlier.

The rise of Chinese nationalism, spearheaded by the northward advance of Chiang Kai-shek's armies in 1926-27 was viewed with growing concern by Japan, where the cabinet headed by General Tanaka was in office. The possibility that the Chinese conflict on the mainland might spread through north China and into Manchuria could only have a harmful effect on what influential groups in Japan viewed as their special interests. After becoming premier, Tanaka had requested Chang Tso-lin's Japanese adviser to initiate discussions with Chang concerning the financing and construction of five new rail lines in Manchuria. There were also conversations at Peking in 1927 between Yoshizawa Kenkichi, the Japanese minister to China, and Yang Yut'ing (q.v.), Chang Tso-lin's chief of staff. These moves were designed to impress upon China and the world the intention of Japan to continue to view Manchuria as a special sphere of influence. At the end of May 1927, after their advance into Honan had placed the Nationalists in a position to threaten Shantung, Tokyo had sent Japanese military units into Shantung for the ostensible purpose of protecting Japanese lives and property.

In the summer of 1927, Tokyo urged upon Chang Tso-lin the advisability of withdrawing his armies from north China into Manchuria and of securing his position there with Japanese aid. In mid- 1927, however, Chang estimated that his position in north China might still be saved by the widening split within the Nationalist camp in central China.

The Nationalist armies, once again unified under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, began the final stage of their drive on north China in April 1928. At the beginning of May, the Japanese again intervened at Tsinan, capital of Shantung province, in an attempt to divert the Nationalist drive from Japanese interests there. On 18 May 1928, in identical notes addressed to Peking and Nanking, Tanaka clearly outlined a so-called positive Japanese policy. The notes warned that, if disturbances in north China continued, "the Japanese government ... may possibly be constrained to take appropriate and effective steps for the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria." At the same time, Tokyo warned that Japan would act to prevent "defeated troops or those in pursuit of them" from entering Manchuria. Chang Tso-lin was specifically warned that his units would not be permitted to retire north of the Great Wall unless they left Peking peacefully.

Chang's position at Peking was now undermined beyond repair. He stood as a barrier both to Nationalist plans for the unification of China and to Japanese plans for the future development of East Asia. Chang was resentful of Japanese dictation, but he concluded that he had no realistic alternative but to capitulate and to evacuate Peking. He bade farewell to the diplomatic corps at Peking on 1 June 1928 and left the city for Mukden on 3 June. At half past five on the morning of 4 June, the private railway car in which Chang Tso-lin was traveling was wrecked by a bomb explosion. Chang was severely wounded, and he died a few days later. The explosion took place at the point where his train was passing under the bridge just outside Mukden where tracks of the South Manchurian Railway crossed those of the Peking-Mukden line. The murder was apparently the result of a well-laid plan, since the preparations necessary in laying the wires, detonators, and explosives required several hours. Responsibility was generally attributed to the Japanese. In fact, it was later discovered to have been the responsibility of Colonel Komoto Daisaku, a Japanese staff officer, and his associates, who plotted the killing of Chang Tso-lin as part of a larger plan for the seizure of Manchuria by the Kwantung Army.

With the death of Chang Tso-lin, the Old Marshal, in June 1928, a notable chapter in the history of modern Manchuria ended. His eldest son, Chang Hsueh-liang, the Young Marshal, consolidated power at Mukden, and preserved the family dynasty in Manchuria for another three years (see separate article). Slight of stature and rather delicate in appearance, the Old Marshal had never looked the part of the redoubtable Manchurian warlord. A Western correspondent who interviewed Chang Tso-lin at Mukden in 1922 just before the outbreak of the first Fengtien-Chihli war described him as "a slim little man, with shining brown eyes, a kindly smile, and a gentle manner" and added that, had one met Chang casually, one would have taken him to be "a man who had lived his life in a quiet study poring over the Analects of Confucius." Photographs of Chang give a similar impression. Actually, he was harsh and ferocious when necessary, though he preserved a resolute dignity. He was shrewd without being educated, perceptive without being sensitive. The Chang family had been poverty-stricken peasants; he had made them wealthy and powerful. It was the type of success story always popular in China, and contemporary observers recorded a genuine flush of anti- Japanese sentiment at the news of the killing of the Old Marshal.

During his lifetime, Chang Tso-lin, through both circumstances and geographical propinquity, was regarded by many as being pro- Japanese. He first rose to power under Japanese supervision and, in return for their active or tacit support of his rule in Manchuria, served Japanese interests by acting as an effective bulwark against the spread of Soviet influence on the mainland of East Asia. After his death, however, many Chinese writers gave him credit for compromising with the Japanese on minor issues in order to resist on larger ones and acknowledged that he was always shrewd and alert in dealing with Japan. Actually, Japanese support of Chang Tso-lin was never a coordinated national policy, and there were frequent differences of opinion among Japanese military and civilian officials over the appropriate course of action to be taken in Manchuria. Chang Tso-lin's inconsistent policies, his opportunism, and his autocratic rule have often been criticized. Yet, his positive accomplishments also deserve attention. Chang did succeed in maintaining a high degree of stability in the Three Eastern Provinces for over a decade during a period when China was confused and divided and when both Japan and Russia had competing political and military interests in that area. Chang Tso-lin's strength in his own domain rested on several factors. Economically, he was supported by the agricultural resources of Manchuria and by the taxes which that region provided. Chang based his military forces on a developed railroad network and on the Mukden arsenal, which he developed with foreign technical advice. Relatively peaceful conditions in Manchuria also permitted him to maintain a regional currency of relative stability. Chang's expeditions into north China constituted a heavy drain on Manchuria's finances and partially nullified the positive effects of his regional rule. But the physical destruction, agricultural and economic paralysis, and human waste characteristic of the warlord period in China were diverted from Manchuria while Chang Tso-lin was in control there.

Chang Tso-lin's actions, contradictory though they often were, did contribute to the movement of twentieth-century China toward political unification. By extending his power into north China and by playing a part in the balance of power in warlord politics there, Chang blurred the distinction between regional and national commitments and made Manchuria an integral part of the framework of Chinese national politics. Thus, he paved the way for the eventual political and economic integration of the Three Eastern Provinces with the rest of China.

In addition to Chang Hsueh-liang, Chang Tso-lin had several other children. Chang Hsueh-ssu (1903-) was graduated from the Hui-wen Middle School in Peking and the Central Military Academy at Nanking. He was deeply affected by the imprisonment of Chang Hsueh-liang after the Sian Incident of December 1936, when he himself had been detained until Chiang Kai-shek's release. Later, however, he resumed active duty in the Fifty-third Army under Wan Fu-lin, one of Chang Hsueh-liang's former commanders, and advanced to the rank of captain. During the Sino-Japanese war, he disagreed with the passive policies of the National Government against the Japanese. He therefore joined the Communist forces and served under Lu Cheng-ts'ao and Nieh Jung-chen. During the later war years, he commanded a sub-district of the Communist Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning military district. After 1945 he returned to his native Manchuria, participated in the campaigns of the civil war there, and appeared at Mukden when the Communists captured that city in October 1948. After 1949 Chang Hsueh-ssu became chairman of the Liaoning provincial government and served as a member of the Northeast regional government council until 1954; for a time he also headed Northeast University at Mukden. He later served as vice president of the Naval Academy in the People's Republic of China and was given the rank of rear admiral in 1956. In 1954 he was a delegate from his native Liaoning to the National People's Congress. Chang Hsueh-ming (1908-) was graduated from the Japanese Infantry Training School in Tokyo. After Chang Hsueh-liang's intervention in north China in 1930, Chang Hsueh-ming became commissioner of public safety at Tientsin. He served with the Nationalist forces in Manchuria in the postwar interlude and presumably surrendered to the Communists when the Nationalists were defeated in that theater. A Chang Hsueh-ming was listed as a member, in the category of "specially invited personalities," of the Third National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in 1959. Another son, Chang Hsueh-cheng, served in the Secretariat of the United Nations in New York.

Biography in Chinese

张作霖
字:雨亭
张作霖(1873—1928.6),人称为大帅,统治东北的军事头目。最初,他是奉天地方军的一名头目,1919年后统治了满洲,成了一个独立王国,直到他死去。1924年后他的势力扩展到北京,成了革命军统一全国的一个障碍。后来他的儿子张学良继承了他的满洲统治者的地位。
关于张作霖的早年生活,在1928年他去世不久所编的家谱中提供了一些资料。根据这些资料来源,他生于奉天海城县,行四。长兄幼年夭折,二兄是个土匪被处死,第三个是姊姊。他父亲张有财约死于1882年,他母亲再嫁给村里的一名兽医。年轻的张作霖既出身农家,又未受过教育,当时看来似乎没有什么出息。
他在二十岁前就开始当兵,隶于宋庆的毅军,参加过1894—1895年中日战争。战后回奉天组织武装防卫本县。他颇有领袖才能,建立了他自己的一支实力充裕组织良好的部队。他在奉天训练地方武装时,和后来当伪满洲国总理大臣的张景惠、吉林督军张作相来往密切。因为他不在清政府的军事编制之内,所以被看作是土匪。
1904—1905年日俄战争中,张作霖的部队成了日军的一支非正式的友军,经常袭击俄军。在这次战争中,张作霖增强了军事实力,在南满树立了威望。战后,他和盛京将军赵尔巽谈妥,编其部队为一个团。张作霖从此找到了一个政治靠山,虽然当时并未立即走运。后来,赵调归京师,但于1911年4月又回沈阳任东三省总督。辛亥革命前夕,赵尔巽所统的部队有四十营,分为五路,张作霖为前路巡防队统领,驻洮南府。
武昌起义,赵尔巽从辽源、通辽一线调后路巡防队至沈阳,张作霖感到政治机会来到,他自作主张进驻沈阳。赵尔巽对此默加承认,不久又让他统率驻沈阳铁岭一线的中路巡防队。蓝天蔚统率的第二混成旅发动叛变,张作霖很快把叛变镇压下去,他对维持东北地方治安作出很大贡献。
民国政府成立,1912年袁世凯掌握了政权,东三省名义上受北京统治。奉天巡防队改编为第二十七、第二十八两师。1912年9月,张作霖升为少将,统率第二十七师,原左路巡防队统领冯德麟统率第二十八师。
1912年11月,张锡銮继赵尔巽为奉天都督,他与张作霖、冯德麟早有交情,所以颇能得到他们的服从和尊敬。1915年袁世凯准备在北京称帝,张作霖、冯德麟起初表示拥护,但袁世凯委任了他的亲信段芝贵为东三省军务督理兼奉天督军。段芝贵的父亲段玉衡(译音)在张作霖几年前和清政府协谈时曾作过担保。段芝贵的任命很明显是对张作霖在满洲的政治雄心的挑战;袁世凯在任命段芝贵的同时,命令张作霖第二十七师调往湖南。
显然由张作霖自己在背后策划的“群众反对”张的调动,张作霖才免予调往湖南。1916年12月,反袁帝制运动已在云南掀起,张作霖故意让人散布满洲将告独立,计划成立保安会。张作霖威胁段芝贵的权力,袁世凯如要保持奉天安宁,就只能给张作霖委以重任。段芝贵辞职离沈阳,张作霖即被委为奉天巡按使。
袁世凯死后,张作霖着手巩固其在南满的地位。他控制二十七师,任奉天督军兼省长。二十七师五十三团团长汤玉麟打算反对张作霖。事被发觉,汤玉麟带了少数部队逃往新民,张作霖令张作相以骑兵追击,经冯德麟二十八师五十五团团长张海鹏出面干预,汤玉麟才获救。
张作霖拟对此不加追究,但冯德麟却想利用这个机会,他和第二骑兵团团长吴俊升联系企图倒张作霖。这个计划张作霖知道后,他多方调动,派二十八师五十六团去辽西剿匪。1917年5月底张作霖调二十七、二十九师袭击冯德麟,宣布撤换师长,冯德麟为了解除他的困境,和张勋谈妥,他仓促离去,参加七月间的张勋复辟活动。从此,张作霖又控制了二十八师。
1917年,张作霖又取得了一次胜利,他的支持人孙烈臣由内阁总理段祺瑞任命为黑龙江省督军。1918年,张作霖依仗其奉天的军力,支持段祺瑞、徐树铮向直系的冯国璋施加压力。段祺瑞再次出任内阁总理后,1918年9月,任命张作霖为东三省巡阅使,以此作为酬谢,这一年中,张作霖又增加了七个混成旅的军力。1919年中,吉林督军孟恩远反抗张作霖的领导,张作霖将他逐走,任命张的支持者鲍贵卿为吉林督军。自此,他完全控制了东北,在他最后的十年中,实际上东北已成了他的独立王国。他这几年在华北的政治军事活动,虽无成效,但由于日本的支持,他完全控制了长城以外东北各省。
1917—1920年间,张作霖、段祺瑞互相利用,密切合作。1919年下半年,徐树铮不顾张作霖视蒙古为东北势力范围,在蒙古一带建立个人势力范围,因此与张的联盟关系破裂,但段祺瑞则继续支持徐树铮。张作霖和曹锟等直系军阀联合,直奉联军多次挫败段祺瑞的军队。7月13日,他扬言正在派兵入关。7月18日直军在保定附近击败段祺瑞皖系的安国军,第二天段祺瑞辞职。战争获胜者在新政府的组成问题上未能达成协议。1920年8月中,奉军退回满洲,带走缴获的段军大量军械装备,这更加重了直系军阀和张作霖的不和。
当时外蒙情况的发展,吸引了张作霖和日本方面的注意。1921年春,斯坦培格的白俄旧军干涉失败,3月,蒙古临时人民政府在乌兰巴托成立。5月,俄国红军进入外蒙。外蒙当局虽已宣布脱离中华民国,但民国政府仍任命张作霖为蒙疆经略使,以维持该地区的中国的势力。这一任命,使张作霖的势力伸向内蒙,达到戈壁以南。张作霖的亲信在热河、察哈尔、绥远三个特区担任领导职务。1921年6月6日,俄国红军和蒙古联军占领乌兰巴托,7月10日,改临时人民政府为蒙古人民革命政府。苏联支持蒙古新政府,并于11月5日签订友好条约。征蒙的大量军费就落入张作霖腰包。他又转向华北的政治活动。
1921年12月,张作霖把他选择的工具梁士诒扶上台在北京当内阁总理。张作霖又和段祺瑞联合,他在华北的地位炙手可热,因此引起他的名义上的同盟者直系的警觉。曹锟、吴佩孚不愿将华北让给奉系。1922年1月,吴佩孚迫梁士诒去职,张作霖力图保持梁的职位,但并未奏效。张作霖调动部队进入关内,1922年4月爆发第一次直奉战争。4月19日张作霖通电声称此举乃系统一“后方”。4月22日,曹锟通电反对,称统一之举不需使用武力。其他北方军阀,包括冯玉祥在内,支持曹锟。1922年5月1日张作霖声称今后东北问题当由沈阳东北当局单独处理,满洲方面正与广西、广东的“西南当局”取得合作。张作霖暂时和这些松散的集团联盟,其中包括孙逸仙。
5月8日,在北京附近的长辛店一战,奉军失败,张作霖将部队撤回东北,吴佩孚统治了华北。总统徐世昌在5月1日撤消了张作霖一切职务。但是冲突并未结束,因为张作霖拥有十万兵力,在东北和日本又有特殊关系,他自任东三省保安总司令,充实军力准备再次争夺华北。
1923年初,孙逸仙派汪精卫和张作霖及段祺瑞的支持者浙江督军卢永祥商谈,劝说他们以国民党政纲为基础,结成三角同盟。张、卢坚持以吴佩孚必须推翻,中国必须统一为结盟的先决条件。
张作霖在沈阳执政的地位,造成当时北京政府的对外关系复杂化。张作霖的政府拥有主权国家所具有的职能,其中包括与外国政府签订条约。这种尴尬的局面在有关中东路问题上就很明显了。1924年5月31日,北京政府和苏联签订了一个规定中东路地位及两方的路权的协定。要使该协定生效,必须得到张作霖同意,因为中东路在满洲境内行驶。北京政府派专使去沈阳征求他的同意,但此行失败了。张作霖在中东路问題上的处境是狼狈的,如果他违反北京政府正式签订的协定不见得能得到日本的支持,并且他又准备和吴佩孚重新开战因而又不敢恶化对莫斯科的关系。
苏联政府利用了这个机会,派代表库兹尼佐夫和张作霖在1924年9月20日单独签订了一个沈阳苏联协定,在这个协定中俄国人所获得的中东路的权益和1924年5月的协定中所载的相似,而那个条约却是张作霖所拒不承认的,这样,俄国暂时又恢复了在北满的特殊地位。1924年9月协定另一个特点是,张作霖无视北京政府在有关满洲问题上不征得他的同意而签订国际条约的权力,张作霖虽因此取得了面子,但创立了一个危险的先例。沈阳协定承认了东三省张作霖政府是反抗中央政府的一个独立的政权,这为1932年满洲国宣布独立打下了基础。
1924年9月1日江浙战争发生。张作霖立即宣布支持卢永祥并向热河进兵,在张进兵同时,吴佩孚向省会承德增兵。9月5日,孙逸仙发表宣言反对曹锟、吴佩孚,9月18日宣布即将进行的北伐,旨在推翻军阀及其靠山帝国主义。
10月初,张作霖袭击山海关,吴佩孚往北面调兵守卫山海关,因吴部冯玉祥倒戈而形势大变,冯弃守古北口,直向北京进军,举行政变。10月又创议和平解决问题。冯玉祥在北京的政变是事先与张作霖商定的。冯玉祥军和奉军张宗昌部切断布防在长城东端的吴佩孚部的退路。此次战役以直军惨败告终,从而使奉系在华北的地位空前强大。
北京的新政权是张作霖、冯玉祥、段祺瑞的联盟,但他们一旦获得胜利,联盟就开始瓦解。其中重要问题之一是和华南国民革命力量的关系问题。在南方,孙逸仙、国民党正和共产党联合而日趋巩固。张作霖反对革命变革,1924年12月,他会见来北方和实力派军人商谈国事的孙逸仙。他感到孙逸仙的主张和他与段祺瑞的大不相同。孙逸仙已身患重病,12月底才到北京,冯玉祥已和他的同盟者不和而散伙,张作霖、段祺瑞显然反对孙逸仙所希望建立的以国民党为主体的新政府。1925年8月,孙逸仙去世,局势更加混乱了。
张作霖和奉系军阀向南方推进,1925年初到达上海地区,并准备沿陇海路向西推进到河南地区。但在这一年里他不断遇到拥有武装的军阀的抗争。在长江下游的孙传芳于1925年10月击溃奉军,张作霖昔日的盟友冯玉祥又从河南加以胁迫。鉴于军事形势不利,又由于他向段祺瑞施加政治压力所造成的在北京的恶劣处境,张作霖将他的主力部队撤往长城,调出关外。
当时冯玉祥和孙传芳、吴佩孚联合,纠集部队从华北驱走奉军,张作霖派代表游说冯玉祥意在拆散他们的联合,冯玉祥表示不另结新盟而赞助和张作霖联盟,实际上以此争取了奉军将领郭松龄叛反他的上司张作霖。1925年11月,郭松龄通电要张作霖让位给他儿子张学良。郭松龄此举的目的在于使冯玉祥国民军袭击华北时,转移张作霖的注意力于满洲。郭松龄的行动即使没有苏联的实际帮助,也显然得到苏联同情。由于日本立即干预沈阳地区的局势,此举失败,郭松龄被捕,1925年12月被处决。
苏联和日本为了在满洲这个要害地区争夺势力范围,因此他们都密切注意满洲形势的发展。张作霖由日本官员的间接帮助战胜了郭松龄,但是对局势的稳定起不了多大作用。1926年1月,他又发泄他的反俄情绪,为了想干脆取消苏联在满洲的铁路权益,1926年1月21日,东北当局横蛮逮捕中东铁路苏方总办伊凡诺夫,三名苏方经理,和多名苏方公民。第二天,莫斯科也同样以横蛮态度提出最后通牒,限三日之内释放被捕人员,恢复铁路正常运行。苏方的军事威胁迫使张作霖退缩,1月24日在沈阳签订协定,恢复铁路原状。
在国内政治领域内,张作霖在1926年1月和吴佩孚联合行动,吴佩孚是张作霖的当然同盟者,因为他们两人都力求对冯玉祥加以报复。冯玉祥慎重估计了对方能集结起来向他进攻的军事实力,决心辞离各职去莫斯科访问。他的国民军在华北被击败,退回到内蒙地区。这一年,以广州为基地的国民革命军在7月开始北伐,经湖南而入长江流域。奉军和长江下游的孙传芳达成协议;1926年12月,北方军阀正式联合共同抵御由南方汹涌而来的革命军,12月1日,他们在天津开会,宣布成立安国军,以张作霖为总司令,孙传芳、张宗昌、阎锡山为副总司令。吴佩孚虽加入了这个联盟,但他不为张作霖所信任,所以没有担负司令职务。
1927年春,张作霖在北方的地位受到沉重打击。唐生智、张发奎率领的革命军强攻在河南的奉军,而冯玉祥又表示同情国民革命,从侧翼攻击张作霖的部队。5月28日,张作霖下令奉军南线部队撤至山东、直隶,6月5日,阎锡山宣布投从国民革命军并劝张作霖加以效法。6月18日,张作霖公然自封大元帅,这是袁世凯、孙逸仙曾拥有过的职称。他并表示要留在北方首都。他在北京把持了最后的短命的至高地位,实际上意味着这个早已没有实权的北京中央政府确已终结了。
张作霖在北京居于尊位的最后一个阶段,中苏关系更加恶化,这在相当程度上由于蒋介石1927年春反共政变而加剧。张作霖自日俄战争以来对俄国人、无论白俄或赤俄一贯心怀疑窦,他并不以1926年中东路事件的失败为戒,又对华北的苏联利益和苏方代表进行了一系列沉重打击。2月28日,张宗昌扣留驶往汉口的苏联船只“潘姆亚•列宁娜”号。可能由于张作霖获得情报证据,因而袭击了苏联驻北京使馆。4月6日,张作霖下令由北京警察厅警察和他的部队进使馆区搜查苏联使馆宅邸,劫走中文俄文档案数车,其中有苏方特工和共产党在中国活动的材料。同时又逮捕了三个月前就躲藏在苏联使馆内的李大钊和其他共产党人。
中国民族革命兴起,1926—27年蒋介石的北伐军向北方挺进,这件事引起了日本田中将军为首的内阁的关切。日本的有势力集团认为中国本部的冲突可能会扩大到华北以至满洲,那样就必然损害他们的特殊利益。田中任总理大臣后,即促张作霖手下的日本顾问和张作霖商讨兴建满洲五条铁路的财政建筑问题。1927年,日本公使芳泽谦吉和张作霖的总参议杨宇霆在北京也进行了对话。这一些行动,都是为了使中国和世界都了解到日本继续视满洲为其特殊势力范围的意图。1927年5月底,国民革命军进占河南后,将进迫山东,日本借口保护侨民和财产派部队进驻山东。
1927年夏,东京催促张作霖采取将部队从华北撤到满洲的良策,以便得到日本帮助而巩固其地位。1927年中,张作霖估计,由于华中国民革命阵线内部的分裂扩大,他在华北的地位可能还有希望。
1928年4月,国民革命军又由蒋介石统一领导,向北方最后进军。5月初,日本又在山东省会济南进行干预,企图牵制国民革命军攫取日本在那里的权益。1928年5月18日,田中内阁同时向北京、南京发出照会,明确提出其所谓积极的日本政策。照会警告说,华北倘仍动荡不安,“日本政府将不得不采取适当有效步骤以维持满洲的和平和秩序”。东京又警告说,日本将阻击“败兵或追截部队”进入满洲。又特别警告张作霖说:他的部队不准撤往长城以北,除非其部队和平地撤离北京。
这样,张作霖在北京的地位毫无指望了,他成了国民革命军统一中国和日本开发东亚计划的绊脚石。张作霖对日本的警告非常气愤,但他认识到没有其他现实选择的路可走,只得屈从,撤离北京。1928年6月1日他向驻北京的外国使团告别,6月3日离北京去沈阳,6月4日晨五时半,张作霖的专车遇炸翻毁,张作霖身受重伤,几天后死去。出事地点在沈阳近郊南满路和京沈路交叉处的一座桥梁。这次谋杀事件,显然是事先妥为布置的,埋电线、雷管、炸药的准备工作需要好几个小时。一般都认为这次谋杀是日本人干的,此后查明系日军参谋河本大佐等人布置行动的。他们刺杀张作霖,是实现关东军占领满洲的整个庞大计划的一个组成部分。
1928年6月张作霖大帅之死,结束了满洲近代历史上引人注目的一页。他的长子张学良少帅,还在沈阳巩固权力,维护满洲的张家王朝达三年之久。
张作霖身材痩小,容貌雅致,看起来不像是一个令人生畏的满洲军阀。1922年第一次直奉战争前,有一个西方记者在沈阳访问过他,据该记者的描写,张作霖“瘦弱的小个子,棕黄的眼睛炯炯发光,笑容可掬,举止文雅”,他又说,倘偶然与张作霖相遇,会认为他是一个“沉浸在专心研读孔子论语的恬静生活中的人”。他的照片也给人以相同印象。事实上,他虽自恃庄重,但一旦发作,便粗暴凶残。他机灵但无才智,他善洞察但不敏锐。张作霖出身贫寒农家,而他却使张氏家族有财有势,这是民间熟知的典型故事,当时的观察者们听到大帅被刺的消息后,激于反日情绪而对之更加以渲染。
由于环境和地理条件的关系,在张作霖活着的时候被认为是亲日的。他最初是在日本扶持下上台的,他为维护日本的利益充当了制止苏联势力在东亚大陆扩张的有效工具;而日本人则明里或暗地支持张作霖在满洲的统治。他死后,不少中国作者称赞他为了在大事情上抵制日本,因此在小问題上向日本妥协让步,并认为他在同日本打交道时一贯机灵警惕。事实上,日本支持张作霖并非日本协同一致的国家政策,对满洲应采用何种适宜的行动方针,在日本的军政人员中间往往有不同意见。
张作霖所实施的反复无常的政策,他的投机取巧的态度以及他的专横统治,常被人指责,但他的积极成就也得到重视。正当国内混乱分裂,日俄在满洲存在着相互争夺的政治和军事利益的情况下,张作霖确实使东三省保持高度稳定达十多年之久。张作霖用以统治其地区的力量,有几方面因素。经济上,他依靠满洲的农业资源和税收;军事上,他依靠扩建铁路网和聘请外国专家发展沈阳兵工厂;在满洲相对平静的局势下,他能发行地区货币并维持相当稳定的币值。张作霖进兵华北,严重地涸竭了他在满洲的财源,并且部分地抵消了他在满洲地区统治的积极成果。张作霖统治满洲的时候,国内军阀混乱时的物力损毁,农业上、经济上的瘫痪,人力摧折这些现象并未在满洲出现。
矛盾的是:张作霖的所作所为又往往促成了二十世纪中国的政治统一运动。他向华北扩充势力,他在华北军阀政治斗争中的权力平衡方面起了一定的作用,这样他就敉平了地城性和全国性的界限,而使满洲成为全国政治结构中不可分割的一部份,因此他为东三省最终从政治上、经济上统一于全国开拓了道路。
张作霖除长子张学良外,还有几个儿子。张学思(1903—)毕业于北京汇文中学和南京中央军校。他对1936年12月西安事变后张学良被监禁一事深有感触,他自己也在西安事变时被拘留到释放蒋介石时为止。后来,他在张学良旧部万福麟五十三军中服役,递升为上校。中日战争时,他对国民政府在抗日问题上采取消极政策表示不满,因此投入共产党军队的吕正操、聂荣臻部。中日战争末期,他在共产党冀热辽军区的一个分区担任司令。1945年后,他回满洲旧地参加国内战争。1948年10月,共产党进占沈阳时,他也在那里。1949年后,他任辽宁省主席、东北行政委员会委员一直到1954年,并担任过沈阳东北大学校长之职。以后,他担任了中华人民共和国海军学校副校长,1956年,授予他海军少将军衔。1954年,他是人民代表大会辽宁代表。张学铭(1908—)毕业于东京步兵学校,1930年张学良进入华北,他任天津警备司令。抗日战争胜利后曾在满洲国民党军队中任职,后来可能因国民党军在东北战场被击败他就投降了共产党。1959年他为中国人民政治协商会议第三届全国委员会的特邀代表。张作霖的又一个儿子张学曾在纽约联合国组织秘书处任职。

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