Chou En-lai (1898-), the leading international spokesman for the People's Republic of China, served as foreign minister and as the principal executive officer in the Central People's Government.

Although his native place was Huaian, Kiangsu, Chou En-lai was born in Shaohsing, Chekiang, where his family belonged to the local gentry and owned a small business. He had a younger brother, Chou En-shou. Although his father, Chou Yun-liang, passed the civil service examinations, he never received an appointment. Chou's mother reportedly was well read in traditional Chinese literature. His father died while Chou En-lai was still a child, and the family finances became straitened after the turn of the century. Chou was sent to live with his grandfather in the Huaian district of northern Kiangsu, where he received a traditional education in the Chinese classics. Chou then was sent to Mukden to live with an uncle (his father's older brother), who was a police official. In Mukden, he attended the Hui-wen School.

After being graduated from primary school, Chou En-lai was sent to Tientsin in 1912 to attend the Nankai Middle School, directed by the prominent educator Chang Po-ling. Like many of his contemporaries, Chou was attracted to the writings of strongly nationalist scholars of the early Ch'ing period, notably Ku Yen-wu (1613-1682) and Wang Fu-chih (1619-1692). Chou En-lai frequently contributed to school publications, and he took part in school theatrical performances. With several schoolmates, he established a small study group known as the Chin-yeh lo-ch'un [respect work and enjoy group life] society. He was graduated from the Nankai Middle School in 1917 in the same class with K. C. Wu, who later became a prominent official in the National Government.

With financial assistance provided by his uncle, Chou went to Japan in the autumn of 1917. He lived in Tokyo, where he studied Japanese and enrolled as an extramural student at Waseda University. Later, he moved to Kyoto, where he attended lectures given by Kawakami Hajime, the chairman of the department of economics at Kyoto University, who was becoming interested in Marxist economic theory. Chou also took part in the activities of the Hsin Chung-kuo t'ung-hsueh hui [new China students' association], made up of Chinese students in Japan, and through that organization he kept informed of the shifting patterns of student opinion in China.

After the outbreak of the May Fourth Movement of 1919, political activities among the students in north China increased, and the Tientsin students organized a student association. At the urging of his friend Ma Chün (who was executed as a Communist in 1927), a leader in the new student group, Chou returned to China and became the editor of a newspaper published by the Tientsin student association. In the autumn of 1919 he enrolled at Nankai University at Tientsin, founded that year by Chang Po-ling. However, like many other Chinese students of the period, Chou was at least as devoted to political activities as he was to his studies. In September 1919 he was prominent in the formation of the Chueh-wu she [awakening society], formed by students from Nankai and from the First Girls Normal School of Tientsin; it was dedicated to the belief that social progress should be based upon the self-awakening of the individual. Its program embraced humanitarianism, socialism, and anarchism. It began to publish a magazine, Chueh-wu [awakening], on 20 January 1920. In the winter of 1919-20, Chou also joined a small discussion group established at Peking University under the guidance of Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao (qq.v.) for the study of Marxist theory. Mao Tse-tung was also a member of that circle. The activities of the Chueh-wu she attracted the attention of the Tientsin police, and Chou and a number of other leaders of the group were jailed after participating in an anti-Japanese student demonstration. After several months, the students were released, primarily as a result of the efforts of Chang Po-ling, the president of Nankai University; Yen Hsiu, Chang Po-ling's mentor and a prominent citizen of Tientsin; and Liu Ch'ung-yu (d. 1941), a lawyer and the editor of the Peking Ch'en Pao [morning post].

After his release from jail, Chou En-lai joined the group of Chinese students who left for France in October 1920 under the auspices of the work-study program (see Li Shih-tseng). When he arrived in France, Chou, who had not yet committed himself politically, set about exploring Western creeds that might be relevant to the needs of twentieth-century China. He became acquainted with Chinese students from Hunan province who had been associated with Ts'ai Ho-sen (q.v.) and Mao Tse-tung in the Hsinmin hsueh-hui [new people's study society] at Changsha in the 1918-20 period. Ts'ai Ho-sen was in France in 1920, and he was a leading figure in the group of Chinese studying at the College de Montargis south of Paris.

While in France, Chou En-lai did not enroll at any school. He apparently supported himself by working at odd jobs. His proletarian life in France apparently was limited to a two-week stint at the Renault automobile works in Paris. At some time he became a Marxist. After that time Chou devoted himself almost completely to political work. He traveled in France and Germany to influence Chinese student opinion. In Berlin, he first met Chu Teh (q.v.). Chou probably was not in Paris when a branch of the China Socialist Youth Corps was formed there in the winter of 1921, but he knew many of its original members well; most were young Chinese from Hunan and Szechwan. By July 1922, Chou had returned from Germany to France. When in an obscure Paris hotel a small group formally established the European headquarters of the Chinese Communist party, he was present. Others active in that nascent group were Chao Shih-yen, Li Fu-ch'un, Li Li-san, and Wang Jo-fei, as well as Ch'en Yen-nien (q.v.) and Ch'en Ch'iao-nien, the two sons of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, then the general secretary of the Chinese Communist party. Chou did not work full time at headquarters, but he was a frequent contributor to its publications, notably Shao-nien [youth] and Ch'ih-kuang [red light]. He wrote under the pseudonym Wu-hao. Early in 1923 some of the Chinese students left France for the Soviet Union, where they were offered free education at the University for Toilers of the East. Chou became active in recruiting students for the university, and he traveled to Belgium and Germany for that purpose.

Chou's activities in Europe during 1923-24 consisted principally in promoting the interests of the Chinese Communist party and the Kuomintang; the Chinese Communists, on Comintern instructions, then were allied with the Kuomintang branch organization in Berlin. In March 1924, when the Kuomintang established a European headquarters at Paris, Chou and two other Communists, Jen Cho-hsuan (q.v.) and Li Fu-ch'un, joined its executive committee. Opposition groups among the Chinese students in Europe included the anarchists and a right-wing nationalist group which opposed the Kuomintang-Communist united front and the pro-Russian orientation of the two parties. The nationalist group headed by Tseng Ch'i and Li Huang (qq.v.) , formed a separate political party, the Chung-kuo ch'ingnien-tang [China youth party] at Paris in December 1923. In spite of disputes and occasional fights among the contending factions, the majority of the young Chinese in Western Europe during the early 1920's were united in advocating a strong and unified China and in assailing the ineffectual Chinese government at Peking and the foreign powers which exploited its impotence for their own purposes. The clashes among the factions, therefore, usually ended in peace talks. In such negotiations, Chou En-lai, often accompanied by Hsu T'e-li (q.v.), spoke for the Communists.

An entry in Tseng Ch'i's diary confirms Chou En-lai's presence in Paris as late as 7 June 1924. Soon thereafter, Chou returned to China, visited his family, and went to Canton, where Sun Yatsen was planning a nationalist revolution based on the Kuomintang-Communist alliance and on military and other aid from Russia. At Canton, Chou was appointed in 1924 as a secretary of the Kwangtung provincial committee of the Chinese Communist party. He also became deputy director of the political department of the Whampoa Military Academy. Chiang Kai-shek was commandant at Whampoa, and Liao Chung-k'ai (q.v.) was the senior Kuomintang representative in charge of political affairs. Tai Chi-t'ao (q.v.) served under Liao as head of the political department. Although Chou was only in his mid-twenties, he held a position of considerable responsibility. Tai often was absent from Whampoa; at such times, Chou directed the political department. He also acted as a secretary to General Bluecher (known as Galen), the Russian military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek.

In August 1925 the Kuomintang armed forces in Kwangtung were reorganized as the National Revolutionary Army, with Chiang Kai-shek in command of its First Army. The 1st Division of the First Army, composed of Whampoa cadets, was commanded by Ho Ying-ch'in (q.v.). Chou En-lai was appointed party representative and head of the political department of that division. In October 1925 the 1st Division was ordered into action in the second eastern expedition against the military forces of Ch'en Chiung-ming (q.v.) in Kwangtung. That campaign was brought to a successful conclusion in the winter of 1925, and Nationalist troops captured Swatow. Chou En-lai then became special commissioner of the East River district of Kwangtung and directed the organization of trade unions at Swatow to support Canton's political program.

During the winter of 1925 there was friction between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists. The tension became acute in March 1926 when Chiang Kai-shek arrested the captain of a naval gunboat at Canton on the charge that he was attempting a Communist coup. Chiang utilized the incident to remove all Communists at Whampoa from posts of responsibility. Chou En-lai, who was then at Swatow, according to report was arrested and detained for a short time in the aftermath of this affair, but was released on Chiang Kaishek's orders. Chou privately agreed with Ch'en Tu-hsiu in contending against Chiang Kai-shek's urgency in undertaking a military campaign designed to break the power of the generals who controlled north and central China. Nevertheless, Chou continued to push compromise measures intended to preserve the agreement reached and to participate in some sort of alliance at Canton.

After the Northern Expedition began in July 1926, Chou traveled secretly to Shanghai, where he worked for several months to organize labor unions and other groups as a preliminary step toward breaking the control of Sun Ch'uanfang (q.v.) in the lower Yangze valley. In March 1927 Chou directed the general strike of Communist-controlled unions at Shanghai, which laid the city open to the Nationalist military forces and which shocked the Western powers into recognition of the revolutionary potential of a Communist-controlled mass movement. A month later, when Chiang Kai-shek struck against the Communists, Chou En-lai, who was still using the pseudonym Wu-hao, was arrested and imprisoned. The Nationalist general Pai Ch'ung-hsi (q.v.), who was present at Chou's interrogation, reportedly was impressed by Chou's courageous bearing, did not probe his case, and permitted him to go free. A fictionalized account of the turbulence of Shanghai in 1927 is given in Andre Malraux's novel La condition humaine (Man 's Fate) , in which the Communist protagonist, Kyo Gisors, supposedly is modeled on Chou En-lai.

By the time the Chinese Communist party convened its Fifth National Congress at Hankow in April 1927, its Shanghai apparatus had been driven underground. The tensions between the Communists and the left-Kuomintang leaders of the Wuhan regime were reflected within the Chinese Communist party leadership, which gave birth to bitter debate about the Comintern-sponsored policy of continued alliance with the Kuomintang. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was reelected to the position of general secretary of the party, but he faced growing opposition from party members, notably Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai (q.v.) and his associates. In 1927 Chou was elected for the first time to the Central Committee of the party and to its military committee. According to Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai's 1928 book, Chung-kuo ko-ming yü Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang [the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist party], Chou also was elected to the Political Bureau in the spring of 1927. He apparently remained at Wuhan until July, when a purge of the Communists was carried out by Wang Ching-wei and the Kuomintang authorities there. On 22 July 1927 he went to Kiukiang.

Official Communist statements give Chou En-lai and Chu Teh the major credit for directing the insurrection of 1 August 1927 at Nanchang, an uprising which was later celebrated as the birthdate of the Chinese Red Army. In fact, the organizational structure and chain of command in the Chinese Communist party in the summer of 1927 were not clearly defined, and uprisings were directed primarily by men on the spot. By the time Chou En-lai reached Nanchang, most of the planning had been completed by Yeh T'ing, Ho Lung (qq.v.) , and others. Because they were unable to hold Nanchang, the Communists retreated southward, hoping to establish a Kwangtung base. After marching through Kiangsi and Fukien, they attacked Swatow and held it from 23 to 30 September. Then the Nationalists recaptured it. At Swatow, Chou suffered an attack of malaria and was escorted by fellow-Communists to Hong Kong, where he received medical treatment. After the Communist attempt to seize Canton in December 1927 ended in debacle, he returned to Shanghai.

In 1928 Chou went to Russia to attend the Sixth National Congress of the Chinese Communist party. He was reelected to both the Central Committee and the Political Bureau and was named to direct the party's military committee and its organization department, though he later relinquished command of the organization department to Li Wei-han (q.v.). Chou was also a member of the Chinese Communist delegation to the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in Moscow. For a brief period he attended Sun Yat-sen University, and received formal indoctrination in Marxism-Leninism and revolutionary strategy.

Hsiang Chung-fa (q.v.) was elected general secretary of the Chinese Communist party in 1928. Its policies were, however, determined by Li Li-san. The central apparatus, operating underground in Shanghai, continued to stress urban uprisings rather than mobilization of the peasants. Chou returned from Moscow in 1929 to assume direction of the military committee of the party. In 1930 he went to Moscow, ostensibly as a representative of the Workers and Peasants Red Army, to brief the Comintern on the Chinese Communist view of the situation in China. He soon returned to China, where he played a leading role at the important third plenum of the sixth Central Committee, which met in September 1930. Chou, presumably acting on Comintern instructions, criticized Li Li-san's political policies, but he argued that those policies differed from the Comintern line in degree rather than in basic conception. The Executive Committee of the Comintern soon took action which led to the political downfall of Li Li-san in November 1930.

At the fourth plenum of the sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party, which met at Shanghai in January 1 931, a group of young Russian-trained Chinese Communists (see Ch'en Shao-yti) directed by Pavel Mif, the Comintern representative in China, gained control of the central apparatus of the party. At that meeting the so-called Li Li-san line was discredited, and Chou En-lai and Ch'ü Ch'iupai were charged with having treated Li's political errors too lightly. Chou recanted, confessed his "mistaken attitude," and called on the entire Chinese Communist party to "condemn my mistakes." He retained his membership on both the Central Committee and the Political Bureau and continued to head the military committee of the Central Committee.

The central apparatus of the Chinese Communist party, which was under increasingly heavy police pressure in Shanghai, necessarily turned its attention to strengthening relations with the rural bases that had been developed after 1928 under the direction of Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung. Chou En-lai was personally connected with the Communists in Kiangsi, and in the spring of 1931 he left Shanghai for the central Communist base area in southeastern Kiangsi. He was a delegate to the first All- China Congress of Soviets, which was convened at Juichin on 7 November 1931, the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Mao Tse-tung was elected chairman of the newly established Chinese soviet government, and Chou En-lai was elected to its central executive committee.

During the next three years in Kiangsi, Chou En-lai continued to hold prominent positions in the military and political councils of the Chinese Communist party. In 1932 he was named to a key post in Kiangsi : political commissar of the First Front Army, which was commanded by Chu Teh. At the fifth plenum of the sixth Central Committee, held at Juichin in January 1934, Chou En-lai was reelected to the Central Committee and the Political Bureau. The same month, he was reelected to membership on the central executive committee of the Kiangsi government structure at the second All-China Congress of Soviets, which reelected Mao Tse-tung chairman. In Kiangsi, Chou worked closely with Chu Teh; at the same time he had little difficulty in maintaining cordial relations with such rising Communists as Ch'en Yi, Li Fu-ch'un, Nieh Jung-chen, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and others whom he had known in Europe or who had been subordinate to him as political officers at Whampoa.

Late in 1934 the combination of Nationalist military pressure and Communist errors forced the evacuation of the principal base in Kiangsi. As head of the military committee, Chou played an important part in planning the evacuation which preceded the Long March. According to official Chinese Communist reports, Mao Tse-tung gained control of the central apparatus of the Chinese Communist party at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau held at Tsunyi, Kweichow, in January 1935. Mao then became the director of the military committee, and Chou served as his deputy. In the summer of 1935, the Communist marchers from Kiangsi joined forces with the Fourth Front Army, headed by Chang Kuo-t'ao and Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien (qq.v.) , which had moved to Szechwan from the Hupeh- Honan-Anhwei soviet base. Sharp differences arose between the two groups with respect to political policies and final destination. The controversy temporarily divided the Communist forces, and only those men accompanying Mao, as did Chou En-lai and other leaders of the First Front Army, proceeded northward to Shensi province. They arrived in Shensi in October 1935.

After the Chinese Communists had established a new headquarters in northern Shensi in 1935, they began to develop a national united front to resist Japanese aggression. Chou En-lai gained new prominence as a negotiator. In 1936 Chou held informal talks with Chang Hsueh-liang, who was stationed at Sian with the mission of containing the Communists in Shensi. Because Chang Hsueh-liang was more interested in recovering Manchuria than in continuing the Chinese civil war, Chou was able to convince him of the practicability of the Communist proposals for a united front against the Japanese. The result was the quiet termination of military operations against the Communists. In December 1936 Chiang Kai-shek himself flew to Sian to assume personal direction of a new general offensive against the Communist forces. Because Chiang had rejected their proposals for a united front, Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-ch'eng (q.v.) seized him and confronted him with political and military demands. (For the story of this incident, see Chang Hsueh-liang.) Shortly thereafter, Chang sent his own airplane to Paoan, then the Chinese Communist headquarters, to bring back a Communist delegation headed by Chou En-lai to discuss the situation. The delegation, which arrived at Sian on 15 December, included such ranking Communists as Yeh Chien-ying and Ch'in Pang-hsien. At Sian, the Chinese Communists, armed with the information that Moscow favored the preservation of Chiang Kai-shek as the national leader of China, helped to arrange a compromise settlement. Chiang Kai-shek was released on 25 December. It was generally believed in China that Chou En-lai's participation in the Sian discussions had helped to save Chiang's life.

The Sian Incident of December 1936 prepared the way for the establishment of a new political alliance between the Communists and the Kuomintang, and it virtually ensured the outbreak of war with Japan. During the first six months of 1937 Chou made frequent trips from Yenan to Nanking to conduct negotiations with National Government representatives. In September, two months after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang set forth the terms of their collaboration in a political agreement which provided for bi-party solidarity against Japan and for the formal integration of the Communist forces into the military establishment of the National Government.

In 1938, when the National Government established the People's Political Council as a forum for opinion regarding the war effort, Chou headed the Communist delegation. The same year he was named deputy director of the political department of the Military Affairs Commission. His official relationship to Chiang Kai-shek thus became roughly similar to what it had been at the Whampoa Military Academy in 1925. Chou remained at his liaison post at Hankow until that city fell to the Japanese. He then returned to Yenan to attend the enlarged sixth plenum of the sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party, which met in October 1938. When in Shensi, Chou broke his arm in a fall from a horse. In September 1939 Chou went to Moscow for medical treatment. He remained in the Soviet Union for six months, and informed observers in China generally assumed that he utilized the interlude to confer with Soviet officials about Far Eastern problems. Chou returned to China in March 1940, went to Yenan for consultation, and then flew to Chungking, the wartime capital of the National Government, where he was named to membership on the Supreme National Defense Council. He also resumed his position as principal Chinese Communist liaison officer.

Affable and persuasive, Chou En-lai devoted himself primarily to activities designed to present the Yenan case and to mobilize maximum political support for the Chinese Communist cause. One obvious target was the small but relatively influential group of Chinese scholars and liberal intellectuals who, for various reasons, were disenchanted with the political policies and the programs of the Kuomintang. The creation of the China Democratic League (see Chang Lan), was generally conceded to have been a notable demonstration of Chou En-lai's ability to mobilize anti-Kuomintang sentiment. Through the New China News Agency, the Chinese Communist propaganda center in Chungking, Chou and others supervised a steady and subtle propaganda program designed to attract the loyalties of students and other young Chinese to the Communist cause. Chou also was aware of the potential importance of international journalism. He was always available to Western newsmen, and his quick intelligence and casual manner made him a popular figure with the foreign community at Chungking. He also invited selected correspondents to visit Yenan, with the result that generally favorable news reports about the Communist area began to appear intermittently in the Western press. Nor did Chou neglect the Western diplomats who were responsible for political reporting from Chungking.

In January 1941, the clash between Nationalist troops under Ku Chu-t'ung (q.v.) and the Communist New Fourth Army in the lower Yangtze area (see Yeh T'ing), marked the beginning of the end of the unstable political alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communists. Chou En-lai, who was then at Chungking, recognized the gravity of the incident, but continued to carry on his activities. Disregarding Chou En-lai his personal safety, he called press conferences and utilized the facilities of the Chinese Communist press at Chungking to present the Communist version of the clash and to denounce Nationalist provocations. His efforts were not unrewarded, for the Communist liaison delegation at Chungking received some public support. After the New Fourth Army Incident of January 1941, the Communists withdrew all members from the People's Political Council except Tung Pi-wu (q.v.), who continued to make token appearances.

After the summer of 1943, as a result of strained political relations with the Nationalists, Chou spent more time at Yenan with Mao Tse-tung and the other leaders of the Chinese Communist party. From July 1943 until November 1944 Lin Po-ch'u (q.v.) acted for Chou as the Communist representative at Chungking. Because this was a period of unprecedented expansion of Communist political and military power behind the Japanese lines in north China, Chou worked to familiarize himself with the general political and military situation in the countryside and to strengthen personal ties with the top command at Yenan. Late in 1944 he returned to Chungking for discussions with Chiang Kaishek about establishing a coalition government in China. The discussions, a result of an American mediation effort, were not successful. When the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist party met at Yenan in April 1945, Chou made a full report on negotiations with the National Government and on the international situation. At the conclusion of the congress in June, he was reelected to the Central Committee and to the Political Bureau of the party. He also was elected to the Secretariat, which, in addition to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, then included Chu Teh, Jen Pi-shih, and Liu Shao-ch'i. Chou also became a vice chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military Council, the party's top military planning organ.

As the Second World War drew to a close, the United States entered Chinese political life directly in an attempt to mediate the Kuomintang-Communist conflict. The United States government urged direct negotiations between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung. Shortly after the Japanese surrender, Patrick J. Hurley, the American ambassador, flew to Yenan and personally escorted Mao, accompanied by Chou En-lai and other advisers, to Chungking on 28 August 1945. In the wording-level discussions of the next six weeks, the Communists were represented by Chou En-lai and Wang Jo-fei and the Nationalists by Chang Ch'ün (q.v.), assisted by Wang Shih-chieh and Shao Li-tzu (qq.v.) . Although the real issues were not resolved and the talks reached a stalemate on the central issue of military forces, plans were made to convene a political consultative conference at which the major factions would be represented.

The arrival in China of General George C. Marshall as special representative of the President of the United States introduced a new element into the situation. Chou En-lai was at the airport at Chungking to welcome General Marshall on 22 December 1945; T. V. Soong (q.v.) represented the Nationalists. In the ensuing discussions with General Marshall, Chou En-lai served as the principal Chinese Communist negotiator, and Chang Ch'ün represented Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government. In January 1946 a Committee of Three, which included General Marshall, Chang Ch'ün, and Chou En-lai, was established to implement a preliminary cease-fire agreement negotiated under Marshall's direction on 7 January. Despite the lack of basic agreement, the Political Consultative Conference was convened in January 1946 to work toward the resolution of outstanding issues. The conference was composed of eight representatives from the Kuomintang, including Chang Ch'ün; seven from the Chinese Communist party, including Chou En-lai ; fourteen from other minor political parties; and nine non-partisan. At its first session, a truce agreement was signed by Chou En-lai and Chang Ch'ün.

Although the Political Consultative Conference proved to be ineffectual, the Committee of Three continued to carry on negotiations in an attempt to work out practical terms for unification of the National Government and Communist military forces. The difficulties proved to be insuperable. The Chinese Communists then controlled regular military forces numbering over 900,000 men and administered areas of China inhabited by over 90,000,000 people, and they had no real intention of abandoning their holdings. In the ensuing negotiations, which began at Chungking and moved to Nanking in early 1946 after the National Government returned there, both Chou En-lai and his opponents became increasingly intractable. In the countryside, where the decisive campaigns of the Chinese civil war were soon to be fought, cease-fire arrangements gradually broke down. In April 1946, a group of Chinese Communists, including several of Chou's close associates {see Wang Jo-fei), were killed while flying from Chungking to Shensi. Chou was deeply shaken because he suspected that the plane had been sabotaged. Despite the bitter mutual recriminations which clouded the Nationalist-Communist confrontations at Nanking, Chou persisted in his efforts to convince General Marshall of the validity of the Chinese Communist position. He also devoted regular attention to press relations, meeting both Chinese and Western correspondents at Nanking with unfailing tact and eloquence. Even after civil war broke out again in the summer of 1946, Chou remained at the seat of the National Government to preserve a channel of communications. He finally left for Yenan on 19 November 1946, after stating that he saw no possibility of early resumption of talks and that he did not know whether he would return to Nanking if such talks were to be held. However, the Chinese Communists did not completely close the door to renewed negotiations. A small liaison mission, headed by Tung Pi-wu, Chou's former deputy at Chungking, remained in Nationalist territory during the winter of 1946.

Chou En-lai spent the critical months of the Chinese civil war in the countryside of northwest China with Mao Tse-tung and the top political command of the Chinese Communist party. In March 1947, when an anticipated Nationalist drive forced the Communists to evacuate Yenan, Mao, Chou En-lai, and Jen Pi-shih remained in the Shensi hinterland, while Liu Shao-ch'i, Chu Teh, and an alternate working committee moved to the Shansi- Chahar-Hopei base area. In the spring of 1949 the top Communist leaders were reunited in Hopei at the second plenum of the seventh Central Committee. At the end of March 1949 Chou and the other top leaders moved to Peiping to press forward with the preparatory work required to organize a new national government in China. Chou played a key role in the planning meetings which took place in the summer months of 1949.

After the inauguration of the Central People's Government on 1 October 1949, Chou En-lai was elected premier of the Government Administration Council. When the government at Peking was reorganized in the autumn of 1954, he became premier of the State Council, which replaced the Government Administration Council. Thus, Chou was the principal administrator of the large civil bureaucracy created by the Chinese Communists to carry out their major domestic tasks : consolidation of effective political control over the mainland of China and implementation of programs designed to reorganize Chinese society and to mobilize manpower, resources, and capital to gain national economic self-sufficiency and sustained economic growth.

In addition to his government responsibilities, Chou En-lai was the ranking member of the Chinese Communist party top command assigned to serve as spokesman for Peking's official policies in dealing with non-Communist groups in China. From 1949 to 1954 he served as vice chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and in December 1954 he succeeded Mao Tse-tung as chairman of that group. Chou also was the senior official at Peking who set forth and supervised the campaigns which the Chinese Communist party used to organize and direct public participation in and support of official programs. After 1950 Chou was also the principal spokesman of the Central People's Government on the accomplishments, shortcomings, problems, and programs of the regime, and his official reports constitute a comprehensive record of internal developments in the People's Republic of China.

Chou En-lai bore heavy responsibilities in the sphere of foreign affairs. He became the first foreign minister of the Central People's Government in October 1949 and was closely identified with all major international policies pursued by that government. Indeed, Chou became the public voice of the People's Republic of China throughout the world.

In November 1949 and in January 1950 Chou cabled the headquarters of the United Nations and demanded the ouster of the delegates from the Republic of China, whom he labeled "Kuomintang reactionary clique representatives."

Although he did not accompany Mao Tse-tung on Mao's initial journey to the Soviet Union in December 1949, Chou arrived in Moscow on 21 January 1950 and participated in the later stages of the extended Chinese Communist negotiations with Stalin. On 14 February 1950 Chou signed the 30-year Sino- Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance concluded at the Kremlin. A. Y. Vyshinsky, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, signed for the Soviet Union. The treaty [see Mao Tse-tung) and related agreements provided the basis for a new alliance between the two principal Communist powers and for Russian economic, technical, and military assistance to China.

The outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950 gave rise to new political and military problems in the Far East. For a time, the Chinese Communist leaders appeared to be more concerned with the Taiwan policy of the United States than with the fighting in Korea. On 27 June, President Harry S. Truman ordered the United States Seventh Fleet to position itself in the Taiwan Strait. Within 24 hours, Chou En-lai had denounced the American move as "armed aggression against the territory of China in total violation of the United Nations charter."

On 20 August 1950 Chou En-lai sent a cable to the United Nations which stated that "Korea is China's neighbor. The Chinese people cannot but be concerned about solution of the Korean question." However, several weeks passed without more precise definition of that concern. Then, on 30 September 1950, Chou, in a speech at Peking, implied that the crossing of the 38th parallel by United Nations troops would be deemed cause for war. He stated that "the Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists." On 1 October, forces from the Republic of Korea crossed the 38th parallel, and General Douglas MacArthur broadcast an ultimatum to Pyongyang, calling upon it to surrender. Ambassador K. M. Panikkar, the Indian diplomatic representative at Peking, relayed specific warnings of possible Chinese intervention to the Western powers concerned. In his report on his ambassadorship, In Two Chinas (1955), Panikkar asserted that Chou En-lai summoned him to a midnight meeting at the ministry of foreign affairs on the night of 2 October and informed him that if United States troops crossed the 38th parallel and entered North Korean territory Communist China would be forced to intervene.

On 7 October 1950 the United Nations General Assembly in New York endorsed "all appropriate steps to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea," units of the United States 1st Cavalry Division moved north of the 38th parallel, and the combined United Nations forces advanced rapidly toward the Manchurian border. On or about 16 October, "volunteer" units of the Chinese Communist Fourth Field Army began to move quietly into Korea. On 26 October, they went into action against South Korean troops along the Yalu River; on 2 November, the Chinese People's Volunteers committed themselves against United States troops. Beginning in late November, the Chinese Communist forces undertook a counterattack that succeeded in restoring the military situation essentially to what it had been before the outbreak of war in June.

The conflict in Korea served to test Sino-Soviet relations; and Moscow provided substantial assistance to Chinese Communist military forces. However, the treaty and related agreements concluded in February 1950 had left pending certain issues between the two governments, notably the Chinese Changchun Railway and the status of the naval base at Port Arthur in southern Manchuria. In the late summer of 1952 Chou En-lai flew to Moscow, for new negotiations with the Soviet leaders. In mid-September, an official communique outlined the areas of agreement. Although Chou was successful in securing the return of the Chinese Changchun Railway to Chinese control, Soviet use of the naval facilities at Port Arthur was extended during the Korean war.

The death of Stalin in March 1953 introduced a note of uncertainty into relations between the two major Communist powers. Nonetheless, Chou En-lai, who headed the Chinese Communist delegation to Stalin's funeral in Moscow, was accorded precedence over all non-Russian Communist leaders at the funeral ceremony. He was permitted to walk abreast of the senior Soviet leaders just behind Stalin's bier—an unusual honor to be accorded to an Asian Communist leader at an official Soviet function.

After returning to Peking, Chou En-lai, on 30 March 1953, set forth new proposals concerning the Korean war. Negotiations were resumed, and Chou's proposals provided the basis for the agreement on the exchange of prisoners of war, signed on 8 June, and for the armistice agreement concluded on 27 July 1953. Although the Chinese Communists did not win a clear-cut victory in Korea, neither did the United States, the strongest industrial nation in the world. Chou En-lai soon made efforts to derive maximum political advantage from that situation.

Chou's attempts to influence political leaders in the emerging nations had begun at least as early as the autumn of 1952, when an Asian and Pacific Area Peace Conference had been convened at Peking. Because the governments of most of the nations concerned had not established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, the foreign visitors to Peking had no official status. Despite that fact, Chou En-lai had applied himself with diligence and tact to the task of cultivating the Asian and African delegates and of appealing to their national pride and resentment against Western superiority. The 1952 meeting was one of the first notable demonstrations of the "people's diplomacy" that later became a major weapon in Peking's arsenal for international political warfare.

After the termination of the Korean war in 1953, the Chinese Communists, relieved of a severe drain on scarce resources, entered a new stage in foreign affairs. Chou En-lai made his debut in international conference diplomacy in April 1954, when the People's Republic of China participated for the first time in formal discussions involving Western governments on problems of major significance. In addition to Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communist delegation at Geneva included Chang Wen-t'ien, Wang Chia-hsiang, Li K'o-nung, Wang Ping-nan, and other leaders.

The Geneva Conference, which included 19 participating nations, brought Chou En-lai, as Communist China's foreign minister, into direct contact with such prominent and experienced diplomats as Anthony Eden, Georges Bidault, V. M. Molotov, and John Foster Dulles. When no progress was made in the discussions regarding Korea, the Korean phase of the conference was terminated on the initiative of the United States. The nations with direct interest in the Indo-China conflict then turned to that problem. Chou En-lai helped to draw a distinction between Cambodia and Laos, on the one hand, and Viet Nam, which was clearly a more complex problem, on the other. He placed the Chinese residence at Geneva at the disposal of the French delegation for private meetings with Pham Van Dong and other North Vietnamese representatives. Gradually, Bidault, Eden, Molotov, and Chou worked toward settlement of the outstanding issues. On 23 June 1954 Pierre Mendes-France and Chou En-lai drew up the framework of basic agreement. The Geneva Agreement on Viet Nam, signed by France and the Viet Minh, provided for the termination of fighting and for supervision of the cease-fire by an International Control Commission consisting of Poland, Canada, and India. It divided Viet Nam into two zones, roughly at the 17th parallel; established a demilitarized zone between the northern and southern sectors; and provided for the withdrawal of opposing forces across that line. The agreement was followed by a final declaration by other nations participating in the Geneva Conference, taking note of clauses prohibiting the presence of foreign troops and bases in Viet Nam and calling for free general elections throughout Viet Nam. The United States government did not sign the declaration. The elections, designed to bring about unification, were never held. Chou En-lai's performance at Geneva won praise not only from the French, who welcomed his assistance in escaping from the situation created by the victory of the Viet Minh over the French military forces, but also from more detached observers. The Geneva settlement of 1954 also served to buttress Chou's contention that settlement of Asian political problems necessarily involved direct negotiations between Western nations and the People's Republic of China.

Peking's approach to international affairs in the period after the Korean war became relatively moderate. Before this time, Chinese Communist diplomacy had tended to political condescension and the use of strong and belligerent language. During the temporary adjournment of the Geneva Conference in June-July 1954, Chou returned to Asia to hold talks with the prime ministers of India and Burma. Joint declarations were issued with the governments of those two countries ; the agreements emphasized the desirability of peaceful coexistence based on five general principles: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence in international relations. Because Peking recognized that Nehru's policy of non-alignment coincided generally with its interest in establishing a buffer zone in Southeast Asia to safeguard its national security, Chou avoided controversial issues in his conversations with Nehru at New Dehli and emphasized the common interests of their two governments. Chou then returned to Peking by way of North Viet Nam and Hong Kong. On 9 July he left Peking. He went to Moscow and then proceeded to Geneva for the resumption of the conference, arriving in Geneva on 21 July. After the conference ended, Chou visited East Berlin, Warsaw, Moscow, and Ulan Bator (Urga) before returning to Peking on 1 August 1954.

A few months later, the new Chinese Communist emphasis on the theme of peaceful coexistence was reflected in the actions of Peking's delegation, headed by Chou En-lai, to the Afro-Asian Conference, which was held at Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. Chou En-lai scored a personal triumph at the conference as an advocate of reason and moderation in foreign affairs. Chou recognized that the desire of the new non-Western nations was to assert their independence of Western colonialism and their new maturity in international affairs, and he made a strong effort to identify the People's Republic of China with the dominant mood of the Bandung gathering. Before returning to Peking, Chou went to Jakarta, where, after an enthusiastic reception by President Sukarno, he signed a new Sino-Indonesian Treaty of Dual Nationality.

An unexpected result of the Afro-Asian Conference of April 1955 was the initiation of an extended diplomatic encounter between Communist China and the United States. At the Bandung meeting, Chou En-lai made a public offer to enter into negotiations with the United States government "to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East and especially the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area." This offer was accepted, and on 1 August 1955 the government of the People's Republic of China and the government of the United States began a series of talks at the ambassadorial level. The talks began at the Palais des Nations at Geneva, with Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson representing the United States and Wang Pingnan (q.v.), who was then ambassador to Poland, representing China. The first 14 meetings, held in August and September of 1955, led to agreement on the repatriation of Americans and Chinese from the two countries concerned. Although that brisk beginning led some optimistic observers to believe that the ambassadorial talks at Geneva might result in a meeting beween John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State, and Chou En-lai, the talks took the form of regularly scheduled ambassadorial meetings.

The basic Chinese Communist objectives in these negotiations were undisputed recognition of their claim to Taiwan and United States withdrawal from its commitments made in that area in the 1950-55 period. The aim of the United States government was to honor such American legal commitments to the government in Taiwan as the Mutual Defense Treaty of December 1954 and the subsequent Taiwan resolution passed by the United States Congress. To these ends, the Americans sought a formal agreement in principle with Peking regarding the renunciation of force in settling disputes between the two parties. The Chinese Communists emphasized the desirability of reaching agreement on specific issues which they deemed "comparatively easy to settle" as a prelude to the essential issue of sovereignty over Taiwan. The Americans, however, stressed the primacy of general agreement. Little progress was made in resolving Sino-American differences, and after the transfer of Ambassador Johnson in December 1957, no talks were held for about nine months.

Throughout this period, Chou En-lai continued his efforts to settle disputes between China and her neighbors in Asia. When the prime ministers of Pakistan and Nepal visited Peking in 1956, Chou stressed the fact that Communist China would adhere strictly to the principles laid down at Bandung in dealing with friendly nations, regardless of differences in domestic political systems. The Burmese statesman U Nu also visited Peking for preliminary private discussions on delineation of the Sino- Burmese border. Chou's personal diplomacy scored a notable success with Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, who paid his first visit to Peking in 1956; he was clearly impressed by Chou's emphasis on maintaining friendly relations between China and Cambodia. In November 1956, Chou, accompanied by Ho Lung (q.v.) and other officials, left Peking for an extended tour of Southeast Asia, to confirm Communist China's direct interest in the region and to attempt to convince the leaders of these nations that the new China, if treated with respect, harbored no aggressive intentions in Asia. The party arrived in North Viet Nam on 1 7 November, remained at Hanoi for several days, and then went to Cambodia. Chou arrived at New Delhi on 28 November, held talks with Nehru for several days, toured India in early December, and then visited Burma and Pakistan. He returned to New Delhi in late December for further discussions with Nehru.

Chou En-lai's tour was interrupted by the tumultuous events of 1956 within the Communist bloc. The concern of the Chinese Communist leaders with the possible results of Nikita Khrushchev's unanticipated denunciation of Stalin in February was reflected in the issuing of a long doctrinal statement from Peking at the end of 1956 and in the assigning of Chou En-lai to make an emergency trip to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Chou returned to Peking from India on 1 January 1957, spent several days in consultation, and then flew to Moscow. He was accompanied by Ho Lung, Wang Chia-hsiang (q.v.), and a substantial delegation. Chou's mission was to seek the reestablishment of bloc solidarity. After three days of conferences with the Soviet leaders at Moscow, Chou flew to Warsaw on 11 January 1957. He conferred with Polish Communist leaders and then flew to Budapest for a day of talks. Chou emphasized the necessity for all responsible Communists to rally to the banner of Moscow's leadership and to support the "unity of the Socialist camp led by the Soviet Union" in the face of alleged threats from the "imperialist bloc of aggression." After returning to Russia, Chou issued a joint declaration with his Soviet hosts on 19 January 1957 affirming the full agreement of the two nations with respect to Sino-Soviet cooperation and to the international situation.

Chou En-lai then left the Soviet Union to resume his Southeast Asian trip. He went to Kabul, Afghanistan, and remained there until 24 January. He visited India, Nepal, and Ceylon before returning to China in early February by way of Calcutta. The following month, when U Nu, who had resumed office as premier of Burma, visited Kunming in Yunnan province, Chou flew from Peking to confer with him.

Chou En-lai's trip to Moscow and Eastern Europe in the winter of 1956 had marked the emergence of the People's Republic of China as an influence in bloc affairs. Beginning in 1957, Chou and his associates emphasized both the necessity of unity and solidarity in the "Socialist camp" and the fact that various "paths to socialism" were unavoidable. The Chinese dual approach was demonstrated at Peking in the spring of 1957, when Chou En-lai successively received the prime ministers of Czechoslovakia and Poland, who were in disagreement about the post-Stalin Communist party leadership at Moscow.

In February 1958, after bearing major responsibilities for both internal and international programs for more than eight years, Chou En-lai relinquished the office of foreign minister to Ch'en Yi. Nonetheless, Chou continued to play a key role in the conventional diplomacy of the People's Republic of China and in the management of critical situations.

In the summer of 1958 the People's Republic of China began to threaten the offshore islands that lay between the mainland and Taiwan. At the same time, the Chinese Communists attempted to convince Nationalist leaders that the United States planned to abandon Taiwan and that the Nationalists would be well advised to make arrangements with the Chinese Communists. International tensions in the Far East rose to heights comparable to those which had prevailed after the outbreak of the Korean war. For a time, war seemed imminent. Then Chou En-lai, on 6 September 1958, took the diplomatic initiative and made a public offer to resume Sino-American ambassadorial talks "to safeguard the peace." He made no mention of negotiations or of Chinese Communist aims.

The Sino-American talks resumed on 15 September 1958 at Warsaw, with Wang Ping-nan again representing China and Ambassador Jacob Beam, the United States. However, because neither military threats nor political blandishments had caused the United States government to weaken its commitment to Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Communists apparently did not believe that the Warsaw talks would resolve important issues. The 1958 Taiwan confrontation persuaded John Foster Dulles that significant negotiations with Peking were no longer possible. Chou En-lai, in turn, made no mention of the Taiwan crisis in his report to the Second National People's Congress, held in April 1959.

At Warsaw, Ambassador Beam continued to hold talks with Wang Ping-nan until November 1961, when he was succeeded by John M. Cabot. Wang Ping-nan returned to Peking in 1964 to become a vice minister of foreign affairs ; he was succeeded at Warsaw by Wang Kuo-ch'uan. After 1961, the talks were held less often and were utilized by both parties primarily as a channel for secure exchange of communications rather than for the discussion of issues.

The alteration in the character of the ambassadorial talks at Warsaw reflected the change that had taken place by 1960 in the foreign policy estimates of the top command at Peking toward the United States. Reversing the position that Chou En-lai had taken in originating the ambassadorial talks, Peking pressed the line that the basic issue of Taiwan had to be settled before subsidiary issues could be discussed fruitfully. In a private interview with the American writer Edgar Snow on 30 August 1960, Chou articulated the new line: firm opposition to further negotiations with the government of the United States except with respect to Taiwan. Because Mr. Snow was then in China, the Department of State in Washington was not alerted immediately to the shift in Peking's position. Chou En-lai told Mr. Snow that a general "peace pact of mutual nonaggression" among the countries of Asia and those bordering on the Pacific could not be concluded without diplomatic relations between China and the United States and that such relations were inconceivable "without a settlement of the dispute between the two countries in the Taiwan region." After reiterating the conventional Peking position that a dispute between China and the United States is an international question, but a dispute between the Chinese government at Peking and the Chinese government at Taipei is an internal question, Chou went on to suggest that talks should be held separately between Peking and Washington and between Peking and Taipei.

Chou En-lai then set forth stipulations regarding Peking-Washington relations: "in the talks between China and the United States, agreement on principles must after all be reached first before concrete issues can be settled. The two points of principle on which agreement should be reached are : ( 1 ) All disputes between China and the United States, including the dispute between the two countries in the Taiwan region, should be settled through peaceful negotiations, without resorting to the use or threat of force; and (2) The United States must agree to withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. As to the specific steps on when and how to withdraw, they are matters for subsequent discussion. If the United States Government ceases to pursue the policy of aggression against China and of resorting to threats of force, this is the only logical conclusion which can be drawn."

A detailed account of Mr. Snow's 30 August 1960 interview with Chou En-lai was published in the United States in Look in January 1961. Details of that interview and of an interview of 18 October 1960 are to be found in Mr. Snow's book The Other Side of the River, published in 1964. In both interviews Chou stated that the crux of the dispute between Communist China and the United States was the issue of Taiwan.

The year 1960 also marked an important turning point in Chinese efforts to resolve outstanding international issues by negotiating and by increasing Chinese contacts with the new nations of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Beginning in that year, the People's Republic of China signed formal treaties delineating her frontiers with Burma, Nepal, the Mongolian People's Republic, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The agreement with Burma, signed in January 1960, was significant because the Sino-Burmese frontier had long been one of China's most troubled boundaries. In March 1960, Chou En-lai reached an agreement on the Sino-Nepalese border. In April 1960, Chou went to New Delhi for talks with Nehru on the Sino-Indian border issue, but failed to reach agreement with Nehru. He went on to Burma and Nepal. Chou's visit to Nepal resulted in the signing of a Sino-Nepalese treaty of friendship and mutual assistance, which prepared the way for a Chinese program of economic aid to Nepal. In 1960 China concluded new treaties of friendship and non-aggression with Afghanistan and Cambodia. Near the end of that year, Chou paid a visit to Rangoon to ask the Burmese government to act as mediator in the Sino- Indian border dispute.

Relations between the Communist party leaders at Peking and those at Moscow deteriorated after 1960. Nevertheless, Chou En-lai, who had served as chief delegate of the Chinese Communist party to the Twenty-first Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, represented Mao Tse-tung at the Twenty-second Congress, held in October 1961. However, Chou left abruptly before the end of the congress to express Peking's dissatisfaction with Khrushchev. When he returned to Peking, Mao and other top Chinese Communist leaders met him at the airfield.

The deterioration of Sino-Soviet party relations after 1960 led Peking to renew its attempts to gain support in Asia and in other parts of the world. In 1961 Chou conferred with political leaders from Burma, Laos, Indonesia, North Korea, and North Viet Nam. That summer he met with Joao Goulart of Brazil, and in September he received Field Marshal Montgomery. He attempted to convince Montgomery of China's sincere desire for world peace. Chou also received Queen Elizabeth of Belgium, the first member of a European ruling family to visit Peking in many years, and the King and Queen of Nepal. After the Sino-Indian border dispute erupted into military action in later 1962, Chou En-lai worked to preserve friendly relations with the other important nations of Asia. Border treaties were concluded with Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1963. In 1964 France established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

The most notable new aspect of Peking's diplomacy, however, was the extension of Chinese Communist interests and investments in Africa. Chou En-lai played a significant role in relations with Africa, and he consistently emphasized that China and the new nations of Africa shared "common aspirations and demands." By late 1958 Peking had recognized the Algerian Provisional Government established at Cairo and had begun to send aid to the Algerian rebels. When Ferhat Abbas, then the head of the provisional government, visited Peking in September 1960, Chou En-lai spoke of the importance of the Algerian revolt in dissipating French military power in North Africa. In the early 1960's many independent states were formed in the sub-Saharan area, and non- African nations began to compete for the loyalty of the developing countries. Chinese Communist activity in Africa increased considerably. In the autumn of 1 960 Sekou Toure, the president of Guinea, visited Peking. Chou En-lai participated in meetings with him which led to the signing of a Sino-Guinea treaty of friendship and of the first economic and technical aid agreement between the People's Republic of China and an African nation. Chou also held several meetings at Peking with Kwame Nkruhmah, the president of Ghana, who visited China and signed a treaty of friendship in August 1961.

In accordance with Peking's attempt to extend its political influence in the predominantly agricultural areas of Africa and to exploit the antagonism of African nations toward Western neo-colonialism, Chou En-lai made his first trip to Africa. Between December 1963 and February 1964 he visited ten African nations: Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethopia, and Somalia. In March and April 1965 Chou visited Algeria and Egypt. Early in June, he went to Tanzania to return the visit of President Julius Nyerere to Peking in February 1965. After returning to Peking, Chou went to Africa again in late June as the head of a large delegation to the Second Afro-Asian Conference, scheduled to be held at Algiers. However, a political coup in Algeria and persisting disputes among the nations involved in the conference led to its cancellation late in 1965. Chinese policy in Africa had to be readjusted.

In June 1966 Chou En-lai made an eight-day official visit to Rumania. There he met with Premier Ion G. Maurer and with Nicolae Ceausescu, general secretary of the Rumanian Communist party.

Chou En-lai has been recognized throughout the world as Peking's leading diplomat and international spokesman. Within China, however, he has been known best as the principal executive officer in the Central People's Government and as a senior member of the Chinese Communist party. Chou was the only man elected to the Political Bureau at the Fifth National Congress of 1927 who continued to serve as a member of that body after the Seventh National Congress of 1945. In September 1956, at the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist party, he was reelected to both the Central Committee and the Political Bureau. At that time, he also became a vice chairman of the Central Committee and a member of the prestigious standing committee of the Political Bureau. Although he deferred in public to the venerable Chu Teh, Chou En-lai came to be regarded as the third-ranking member of the Political Bureau after Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i.

Chou En-lai has long been noted for his willingness to make the same demands of himself that he makes of subordinates, his physical vitality, and his tenacity of purpose. Since 1937 Chou has come in contact with more non- Chinese people and attitudes than any other man in the top command of the Chinese Communist party. General George C. Marshall, despite the failure of his mediation mission to China after the Second World War, paid high tribute to the abilities of Chou En-lai, and Dag Hammarsjold, who went to Peking in 1955 to make arrangements for the release of United States citizens detained in China, had an equally high opinion of Chou as a diplomat. Chou En-lai's writings consist of Communist party political reports, most of them written in the 1930's under the name Shao-shan; a great number of unsigned reports on government work and current tasks; and official statements and interviews on foreign policy matters.

While participating in student activities in north China after the May Fourth Movement of 1919, Chou En-lai met a student named Teng Ying-ch'ao (q.v.). She was imprisoned with Chou in Tientsin in the winter of 1919. Chou and Teng were married at Canton in 1925.